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Abstract. This article examines environmental governance in Kosovo, with a particular 
focus on the energy sector. The article considers the degree to which the emerging model 
of  environmental governance is characterised by hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes 
of  coordination. We examine the roles of  a number of  domestic institutions and actors – 
ministries, agencies, and regulatory bodies– and the influence of  external actors, including 
the European Union, the United States, and Serbia. The European Union is building 
Kosovo’s own hierarchical governance capacity by strengthening domestic institutions, 
whilst the United States focuses primarily on market liberalisation, whilst simultaneously 
supporting European Union efforts. Moreover, environmental policy change is not wholly or 
predominantly driven by domestic actors, which can partly be attributed to Kosovo’s limited 
domestic sovereignty. We conclude that the emerging model of  environmental governance in 
Kosovo is characterised by a weak hierarchy, partly as a result of  external actor involvement, 
which disincentivises the government from responding to domestic non-state actor pressure.
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Introduction
This article explores environmental governance in Kosovo, focusing on the country’s energy 
sector. We examine the model of environmental governance that is emerging in Kosovo, 
within the context of its limited statehood and Vattelian sovereignty (Krasner, 2005). Since 
this model of environmental governance appears thoroughly institutionalised on paper, we 
examine whether the corresponding distribution of power is reflected in practice. We explore 
the extent to which Kosovo’s hierarchy and networks are weak, despite external efforts at 
strengthening both. In order to assess the effects of external involvement, we examine the 
roles of the European Union (EU), USA, and Serbia, each of which appear to have divergent 
policies and goals. Taking into account the competing governance agendas – the EU aiming 
to strengthen hierarchical governance, the US focusing on market liberalisation, and Serbia 
acting as a ‘spoiler’ (Menkhaus, 2007) – we examine the extent to which this helps to create 
a government more responsive to external incentives than domestic pressures, thereby 
weakening local non-governmental actors. Lastly, we examine whether Kosovo’s limited 
domestic sovereignty (Krasner and Risse, 2014) and extensive external actor involvement 
help to further weaken non-state actors.
We are particularly interested in exploring the roles of three external actors: the EU, 
USA, and Serbia. This is because Kosovo has ‘limited statehood’ (Risse, 2011) and lacks 
capacity to implement and enforce decisions and laws, which in turn leads to a higher degree 
of external intervention and non-hierarchical coordination (Börzel and Risse, 2010; Risse, 
2011). Kosovo has been administered and supported (practically and financially) by external 
actors since 2000, and thus offers an exceptional opportunity for exploring: (a) how those 
external actors seek to facilitate environmental governance in the context of statebuilding; 
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and (b) external actors interact and compete in the Kosovan space. The EU and the USA 
are of special interest for our analysis, as they have been the key drivers of Kosovo’s post-
conflict stabilisation and to an extent, its independence.
Our key argument is that the EU and the US are helping to build hierarchical governance 
in Kosovo by strengthening its state capacities, which are currently weak. At the same time, 
this type of external statebuilding interferes with Kosovo’s Weberian/Vattelian sovereignty 
(Krasner, 2005), since donor conditionality and international ‘trusteeship’ of states like 
Kosovo has a marked impact on domestic authority structures, decision making, and the 
balance of power (Krasner and Risse, 2014; Lake and Farris, 2014).
EU and US efforts at strengthening Kosovo’s own hierarchy are carried out through 
non-hierarchical steerage. The EU is involved through capacity building and conditionality, 
whilst American involvement is mainly operationalised through donations aimed at building 
state institutions, but also helping to facilitate privatisation of state industries. These two 
positions converge and diverge: as we explore below, donations from the US are not as 
explicitly tied to bargaining and normative change in environmental and energy issues to 
the extent that EU assistance is. The US also plays a strong role in market liberalisation, 
which at times undermines the EU’s efforts at strengthening state capacity for environmental 
governance. The influence of key external actors is often exerted through non-hierarchical 
modes of coordination such as negotiation, lobbying, informal challenges to implementation, 
and normative pressure, with formal rules often interacting with informal practices.
The emergent unconsolidated model is the result of an unsystematic involvement of 
external actors, seemingly with no overall agreement or goal for the direction of Kosovan 
environmental governance, interference from Serbia, little support from domestic political 
elites, no meaningful opportunities for non-state actor involvement and, to an extent, informal 
practices such as corruption which are prevalent in the energy sector across the Western 
Balkan region (BIRN, 2014; Freedom House, 2013; Prelec, 2014). While the EU has driven 
change in environmental governance, primarily through monitoring Kosovo’s compliance 
with the environment acquis, this has often been in cooperation and competition with other 
international actors. We find that non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), have very little lobbying capacity in environmental and energy policy making in 
Kosovo, reflecting broader Western Balkan trends.
This paper is based on the analysis of documentary resources, including institutional reports 
from the main energy provider in Kosovo, local civil society organisations, EU, and domestic 
legislation. These are complemented by data from elite interviews and informal, non-recorded 
discussions with professionals within the field of regulatory governance in Kosovo.
The article first outlines the key concepts used and discusses the definitions of governance, 
and hierarchical and non-hierarchical coordination. Following Risse (2011) and Schneckener 
(2011), we also outline how these may be affected in areas of ‘limited statehood’ such as 
Kosovo. We then explore environmental governance in Kosovo, focusing on the energy 
sector and its regulation as a key component. The article then examines the extent to which 
external actors – the EU, USA, and Serbia – impact non-hierarchical coordination of this 
policy area and its implementation.
Hierarchical and non-hierarchical modes of coordination in areas of 
limited domestic sovereignty
Emerging modes of environmental governance in Kosovo must be viewed in the broader 
context of post-Communist energy transitions (Bouzarovski, 2009) discussed below, and 
governance and statebuilding since the 2000 UN intervention. Kosovo is an apt example 
of an ‘area of limited statehood’ (Risse, 2011): It has strong but not universal international 
recognition, and this has direct impact on its ‘domestic sovereignty’ as its authority structures 
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are not autonomously determined (Krasner and Risse, 2014: 545). Such areas of limited 
statehood are also defined by the state’s lack of capacity to ‘implement and enforce central 
decisions, and a monopoly on the use of force’ (Risse, 2011: 2).
In areas of ‘limited statehood’, modes of governance and coordination may deviate from 
the models seen in Western liberal democratic states. Whereas the latter will typically involve 
hierarchical steering and ‘authoritatively enforcing the law’ through ‘“top-down” command 
and control’ (Risse, 2011: 11), governance in areas of limited domestic sovereignty tends to be 
non-hierarchical (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 211; Krasner and Risse, 2014). In areas of limited 
statehood, as Krasner and Risse (2014: 546) argue, external involvement is significant, since some 
of the functions ‘traditionally associated with the state, have been assumed by external actors’. 
Statehood and sovereignty can be limited territorially (i.e. the government not exercising authority 
or control over a part of the country) or sectorally (i.e. specific policy areas maybe under the direct 
jurisdiction of external agencies). Both types apply in Kosovo’s case: Kosovo has only limited 
territorial control (in virtually all policy areas) of North Kosovo, where Serbia intervenes actively; 
the Pristina government also has limited sectoral autonomy in a number of policy domains in 
which there is a high level of external involvement. Environmental governance is one such policy 
area, since change has often been initiated and led by the UN or the EU.
Due to a lack of capacity to enforce decisions, Risse argues, international actors frequently 
‘interfere authoritatively’ in areas of limited statehood, thus making non-hierarchical modes 
of coordination ‘more common’ (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 211). Frequently, as in Kosovo, 
these interventions are framed in terms of ‘state building’, designed to ‘tackle limited 
statehood directly’ through capacity and institution building (Krasner and Risse, 2014: 551), 
and ‘trusteeship’ of external actors temporarily executing authority in the state (Lake and 
Fariss, 2014: 571). Previously, under the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 
Kosovo was subject to trusteeship. However, the current arrangements and involvement of 
the EU through the Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) are more in line with what Krasner and 
Risse label as ‘contracting’: external control through delegation or agreement (2014: 552). 
The reality of statebuilding ‘on the ground’ is the involvement of a number of external actors 
and organisations each attempting to influence governance and pursuing different and at 
times conflicting agendas (Schneckener, 2011). We identify such tensions between the EU 
and the US in terms of their priorities for the Kosovan energy sector.
With regard to defining governance, we follow Börzel and Risse’s (2010: 114) 
conceptualisation of a process that ‘pinpoints the modes of social coordination by which 
actors engage in rulemaking and implementation’, norm adoption, and social learning. 
Governance is also exercised through informal practices existing outside of the hierarchy and 
can be shaped by local interests and governance ‘spoilers’ (Menkhaus, 2007). In the Kosovan 
case, formal rules are subject to and compete with informal practices, including corruption, 
clientelism, and non-consensual interference from Serbia.
We also adopt Börzel and Risse’s (2010: 114) distinctions of hierarchical and non-
hierarchical coordination, in which hierarchical coordination ‘usually takes the form of 
authoritative decisions with claims to legitimacy’, such as laws. Non-hierarchical coordination 
is ‘based on voluntary commitment and compliance’ and other dispute-resolving mechanisms 
such as bargaining and arguing (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 114). Importantly, according to the 
authors, in non-hierarchical coordination, actors may have unequal bargaining power but ‘no 
actor is subject to the commands of others’ (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 114).
Energy as an area of environmental governance
Given that environmental governance can be defined as a ‘broad range of political, economic 
and social structures and processes that shape and constrain actors’ behaviour towards the 
environment’ (Levy and Newell, 2005: 2), it follows that the energy sector and its regulation 
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form an important part of this process, since energy policies have an immediate and long-
term impact on the domestic and regional environment (cf. Castán Broto et al., 2009). 
Environmental governance implies both ‘rule creating, institution building…monitoring and 
enforcement’ but also a ‘soft infrastructure of norms, expectations and social understandings 
of acceptable behaviour towards the environment’ (Levy and Newell, 2005: 3).
The impact of the energy sector on the environment is especially evident in areas where 
this sector and related businesses contribute significantly to pollution (c.f. Levy and Newell, 
2005: 1). In Kosovo, old and inefficient power plants are the largest source of air pollution 
and have not until recently been subjected to the legal regulation applied within Western 
Europe. Efforts to regulate, modernise, and clean up the key polluting agents in the energy 
sector have coincided with Kosovo’s recent push for EU membership.
The modernisation of Kosovo’s energy sector and the development of environmental 
governance have both been hindered by the country’s history of conflict and post-Yugoslav 
economic transition. Kosovo’s energy supply was part of the Yugoslav network until the 1990s 
and was shaped by Communist economic practices during this time. Most post-Communist 
countries, Bouzarovski (2009) argues, share general features of centrally planned energy 
policies and their subsequent transitions. This initially included attempts to lessen reliance 
on Soviet imports (and therefore a heavy use of domestic natural resources such as lignite) 
and a system of cross-subsidised tariffs which ensured low prices for domestic consumers 
(Bouzarovski, 2009: 457). As with other post-Communist states, Kosovo is subject to 
neoliberal restructuring, ‘reinforced’ by EU accession (Bouzarovski, 2009: 458) of which 
energy policy is part. This includes ‘“unbundling’ integrated energy companies’, ‘removing 
subsidies, liberalizing the tariff structure and allowing free access to the energy market’, 
with foreign companies often envisaged as the buyers of formerly state-owned energy assets 
(Bouzarovski, 2009: 458, citing Stern and Davis, 1998). However, this has generally been 
met with political resistance and state interference by governments ‘unwilling to relinquish 
control of…key political and economic instruments of power’ (Bouzarovski, 2009: 458).
Within this context, the availability of lignite in Kosovo was used to develop two power 
plants, Kosovo A and B, during the Yugoslav times. Other plants were developed using fuel 
oil and (to a limited extent) hydropower. Plans have been developed for the closure of the 
huge Kosovo A plant in 2017 once alternative generating capacity comes on stream, although 
the timetable for this is currently unclear (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network, BIRN, 
2014; Kabashaj, 2012).
Measures to improve the stability of the highly erratic supply and increase its volume 
have involved further developing the use of hydropower. This has required the construction 
of additional power plants, including the Zhur plant and other plants in Belaja, Deçan, and 
Lumbhardi. It has also resulted in the adoption of renewable energy (which until now has 
been limited, partly due to the failure of international investors to carry out wind surveys 
or to have agreed a feed-in tariff with the regulator, prior to installation). Aside from small 
generation plants, the Kosovan Energy Corporation (KEK), which was established in 2005, 
generates almost all of the energy. In an attempt to liberalise the sector and attract investment, 
both the Kosovan energy transmission network (KOST) and Kosovo Electricity Distribution 
and Supply, which covers distribution and supply, have been unbundled from KEK. The 
latter was privatised in 2012 and sold to the Turkish Çalık-Limak consortium of companies.
The energy sector is by far the largest polluter in Kosovo, with claims that Kosovo A is the 
‘worst, single-point source of pollution in Europe’ (BIRN, 2014). The Environment Ministry 
Environmental Protection Agency (KEPA) report (2011: 24) states that CO2 emissions from 
the total coal use for operating Kosovo A and B are estimated at five million tonnes per 
year, with additional pollutants such as dust, sulphur dioxide (SO2), and NOX contributing 
considerably to air pollution. These emissions are significantly above those suggested by the 
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Energy Community’s Athens Memorandum, a 2002 document which governs South East 
Europe’s electricity market integration.1 For instance, dust emissions from the Kosovo A 
power plant are some 18 times higher than the Athens limits, whilst NOX levels from Kosovo 
B are some 1.6 times higher (KEPA, 2011: 24). This situation reflects general Western 
Balkan trends, where concerns over energy supply and growing domestic demand are often 
prioritised over environmental issues (c.f. Hakala and Järvinen, 2012: 40).
Environmental governance and energy policy in Kosovo
At first glance, Kosovo appears to have a model of environmental governance in which a 
number of state and non-state actors coexist in an institutionalised2 and emergent hierarchy. 
However, as this section illustrates, the hierarchy is, in fact, weak. Moreover, the formal 
distribution of power is not reflected in practice, due to the involvement of external actors 
and their incentives, which make the government of Kosovo responsive to international 
rather than domestic demands.
Within the formal legal and regulatory environment (i.e. hierarchical coordination) 
in Kosovo, interactions among state and non-state actors are governed by a complex and 
fragmented web of legislation. Hierarchy is obvious among state actors, including: the 
Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo; the Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning 
(MESP); its agency, KEPA; and municipalities. The overall legislative role of the 
Kosovan Assembly (parliament) defines the remits of MESP and monitors its functions 
and administration of environmental resources (Assembly Support Initiative, 2007). The 
Assembly passes environmental laws and legislation which are translated into policies by 
MESP. Each environmental sector such as water, air, and waste has its own legal framework. 
The creation of this hierarchy involved a degree of external, non-hierarchical steering: the 
MESP was one of the ministries established through UNMIK regulation in 2002.
The majority of Kosovo’s energy and environmental laws were adopted by the National 
Assembly after Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. Until 2000, Kosovo was a 
province of Serbia, but following the 1998–1999 conflict, and until 2008, it was administered 
by the UNMIK and through the Provisional Self-Government. Whilst the institutional context 
of the MESP existed prior to 2008, political debates throughout this period were dominated 
by independence-related issues, marginalising all other discussions, including environment 
and energy. Whilst it can be argued that the legislative context and architecture prior to 2008 
were lacking in capacity to implement environmental governance, they nonetheless enabled 
the adoption of several key laws in the areas of both environment and energy. For instance, 
laws on air protection, energy, electricity, and water were passed in 2004, with laws on 
nature conservation, waste, and plant protection following in 2005 and 2007, respectively. 
Additionally, the MESP prepared a Kosovo Environmental Action Plan 2006–2010 in April 
2006 (later updated for 2010–2015; World Bank, undated). The plan was financed and thus 
steered non-hierarchically by an external actor, the Swedish International Development 
Corporation Agency. It is geared towards environmental improvement and protection, within 
the framework of the policy harmonisation required by the environmental acquis and EU 
integration (MESP, 2006).
1 The Memorandum is officially known as the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional 
Electricity Market in South East Europe and its Integration into the European Union Internal Electricity 
Market’, signed by countries of the Western Balkans, as well as Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and the 
European Commission.
2 Institutions in this context can be broadly perceived as all forms of formal and informal rules that 
govern actors’ interactions within Kosovan environmental governance, which includes environmental 
laws, regulations, and forms of informal interaction.
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The MESP has significant authority in environmental governance: it is responsible for 
developing standards to control emissions and for promoting sustainable environmental 
practices and use of natural sources. Current environmental priorities, stated in the 2010–
2015 Environmental Strategy and Action Plan, are meeting the EU acquis, partly through 
new and strengthened institutions, capacity building, and financial incentives for domestic 
industries (World Bank, undated).
The Energy Regulatory Office (ERO) was also established under UNMIK as a self-
financed and independent body responsible for drafting secondary legislation, with the 
government only responsible for setting overall strategy. The ERO issues licenses to energy 
generators and transmitters, and reviews electricity tariffs. Other related bodies include 
non-majoritarian institutions such as the Kosovo Privatisation Agency and the Independent 
Commission for Mines and Minerals. In common with energy policy in many developing 
nations, these non-majoritarian institutions have been created whilst state ownership remained 
of much of KEK and KOSTT.
A number of non-state actors operate within this energy governance landscape, including 
NGOs and international private consultancy companies (discussed below). Whilst many 
environmental NGOs, such as Millennium and Ecocult, appear to be well established 
and efficacious, our research found no evidence that they undertook effective lobbying 
of key decision makers. In general, civil society in Kosovo has only just begun to engage 
in advocacy (USAID, 2013: 2), and this is reflected in the lack of organised lobbying. 
Additionally, international donations for NGOs have declined in recent years, as the donor 
focus has shifted from Kosovo to the Middle East and the Caucasus (Freedom House, 2013). 
However, the absence of a strong tier of lobbying organisations is also due to the fact that 
most environmental NGOs are primarily involved in local conservation projects or education 
activities. Moreover, the value of lobbying is perhaps not immediately clear: the environmental 
governance institutions, which are the obvious focus of lobbying, are not seen as key decision 
makers, but as implementing partners for EU rules and demands. Furthermore, there is some 
evidence of the ability of NGOs to mobilise around certain issues. In particular, the alleged 
involvement of the government and other key elites in corruption often acts as a focus for 
civil society protest. For instance, one case in which NGOs have demonstrated a capacity to 
mobilise large-scale public protest has been the dispute over high energy tariffs and alleged 
corruption at KEK.3
Despite some civil society activism around environmental issues, political interest 
and debate still focuses primarily on issues of sovereignty, nationhood, and minority 
rights. Amongst political elites there appears to be little or no interest in environmental or 
energy issues, and thus do not respond to these pressures. Political power is won and held 
according to party, ethnic, or regional loyalty (i.e. informal practices resulting in governance, 
c.f. Menkhaus, 2007). This, together with alleged corruption amongst the political elite, 
especially where it relates to the energy sector and privatisation (Freedom House, 2013; 
Prelec, 2014) leaves little room for civil society actors to influence political agendas on 
already marginalised issues such as the environment. This supports the findings of Tosun and 
Shulze (this volume), who suggest that the emergence of forms of environmental governance 
is dependent on domestic interest constellations, and their ability to exert leverage within 
the policy process. In Kosovo, domestic interest groups are weak, because: their power 
is undermined by informal practices of key power holders, which makes lobbying almost 
3 According to ERO staff (authors’ interview with ERO official, Pristina, 15 April 2013), the majority 
of Kosovan consumers find that the electricity bill constitutes their single largest monthly expense. 
Kosovo’s official unemployment rate is 35.1%. Moreover, 34.5% of the population live in ‘general 
poverty’, whilst 12.1% live in ‘extreme poverty’. Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2013. http://esk.rks-
gov.net/eng/
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irrelevant; and the involvement of international actors, which incentivises the government to 
respond to external demands.
External actors: EU
The emergent model of environmental governance in Kosovo is highly dependent on 
external actors. This is most obvious in the case of the EU, which is helping to build and 
strengthen hierarchy. However, the involvement of external actors is not linear and is at times 
contradictory. As this paper demonstrates, USA (with its focus on privatisation and market 
liberalisation) and Serbia (with its informal practices), often weaken Kosovo’s hierarchical 
governance, which, in turn, undermines EU efforts.
Domestic mechanisms of environmental governance operate within a complex formal 
framework derived from the EU’s extensive involvement. Kosovo is a typical ‘environmental 
newcomer’ with lower levels of environmental regulation, higher industrial pollution, and 
high implementation costs for meeting EU environmental rules and norms (Börzel, 2009: 33). 
Broadly speaking, the EU helps to build hierarchical governance in Kosovo by strengthening 
state institutions and enhancing domestic sovereignty. This is predominantly carried out 
through rule and norm transfer, some of which takes place via the Energy Community 
(Renner and Trauner, 2009: 458).
As Padgett (2011) explains, the Energy Community and the internal market are at the 
centre of the EU’s framework of cooperation with neighbouring suppliers and consumers. 
The overall aim is to ensure a steady and reliable energy supply. The Community is not an 
extension of the EU, but it is ‘ingeniously designed to bind non-Member States to EU law 
without admitting them to EU institutions’ (Padgett, 2011: 1077) and has helped to create 
an integrated regional electricity market across the Western Balkans. Whilst governance 
is concerned with norms and learning as well as with rules (Börzel and Risse, 2010), the 
Energy Treaty places a strong emphasis on rule adoption; it is an example of non-hierarchical 
‘external governance’ (Renner and Trauner, 2009: 458) where participation helps countries 
meet accession requirements (Padgett, 2011: 1073).
Kosovo’s record in meeting requirements such as establishing stable regulatory and 
market frameworks is patchy. Environmental issues are still largely neglected by domestic 
state actors. Opinion polls indicate that 69.9% of the public is dissatisfied with Kosovo’s 
efforts to preserve the environment (Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2012). This is despite the fact 
that, on paper, Kosovo has already started to harmonise its environmental laws with EU 
standards, for example, through the 2009 Law on Environmental Protection, which stipulates 
explicitly that the government will ‘adapt the legal requests and procedures’ on environment 
and sustainable development to fit with the EU environmental acquis. The government 
of Kosovo and the MESP are obliged to mainstream environmental protection into their 
respective policies within the framework of EU integration (European Commission, 2012). 
Whilst the EU sets this out as a condition of membership, this too represents an example of 
non-hierarchical steering, since the EU does not ‘command and control’ Kosovo (Börzel and 
Risse, 2010: 115). Although conditionality means that sanctions (e.g. denial of membership) 
can be applied to states that do not comply with EU’s demands, the role and effectiveness 
of conditionality in compliance are contested (e.g. Aybet and Bieber, 2011; Pickering, 2011; 
Spoerri, 2011; Subotic, 2009). The existing literature suggests that domestic actors frequently 
‘go through the motions’ of compliance whilst neglecting normative change (Subotic, 2009: 
167), and that conditionality sometimes leads to ‘short term changes that the EU would 
characterize as progressive’ (Pickering, 2011: 1941).
One effect of the EU’s involvement is that the model of environmental governance 
emerging in Kosovo is highly institutionalised, but ‘on paper’ only. Post-independence 
governments ‘go through the motions’ of adopting environmental protection laws (and 
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responding to non-hierarchical steering) but without really remaining committed to the issues 
(i.e. not responding to EU environmental norms), or creating meaningful opportunities for 
non-state actors, such as NGOs, to participate in debate and decision making (c.f. USAID, 
2013: 2–3). This has the effect that the Kosovan governments will respond only selectively to a 
whole range of environmental challenges, prioritising only those that align with EU demands. 
For instance, the spate of additional environmental and energy laws post-2008 closely reflect 
EU concerns regarding the environmental impact of lignite use in Kosovo as documented 
in earlier Commission reports (European Commission, 2012). As recently as 2012, the 
Commission made an explicit link between air quality, the energy sector, and environmental 
governance in its Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo. It was explicitly 
stated that the adoption of the energy acquis, reform of KOSTT, and the establishment of 
a more efficient energy regulator were necessary to improve overall environmental quality, 
since ‘lignite power plants are the main source of air pollutants’ (2012: 46). Whilst the 
Commission noted that laws and frameworks in the fields of energy and the environment 
are in place, it criticised the (lack of) ‘capacity to implement and enforce legislation (which) 
needs to be strengthened’. The report adds that Kosovo needs to ‘close the Kosovo A power 
plant, in line with its Energy Community Treaty obligations’ in order to improve air quality 
(2012: 46) and that ‘environmental considerations need to be mainstreamed into other 
policies, particularly energy’ (2012: 46). Subsequent (2013, 2014) progress reports suggest 
that this has not been done: the Commission stated in 2014 that Kosovo’s implementation of 
environmental laws remains weak, as does the administrative capacity of institutions in the 
environmental sector (Commission, 2014: 40–41). As an example highlighting the disconnect 
between environmental laws and their implementation, the Commission (2014: 41) noted 
that an ‘eco tax’ collected during car registrations contributes to the Kosovo budget but ‘is 
not allocated to any environmental projects’. In 2014, the EU also warned that Kosovo’s 
failure to close Kosovo A is jeopardising the €60m ‘green energy grant’ set aside for the 
plant’s closure (Zogiani, 2014).
The EU also seeks to shape environmental and energy governance through institution 
building to increase Kosovo’s own capacities. In the energy sphere, the EU (together with 
the US and others) is partly responsible for the creation of KOSTT out of KEK (European 
Commission, 2009). The effect of this involvement has been a limited domestic capacity 
for enforcing authority structures, since the unbundling and creation of various ministries 
were not wholly locally initiatives. Generally, EU’s statebuilding focus in Kosovo can be 
described, following Schneckener (2011), as a mixture of ‘Liberalisation first’, ‘Security 
First’, and ‘Institutionalisation First’. Through EULEX, the EU aims to strengthen both 
security and domestic institutions such as the judiciary; additionally, its norm promotion 
in the region means that an emphasis is also placed on political and market liberalisation 
(Schneckener, 2011: 236). At times, these priorities have differed to those of the US donors, 
especially in the field of energy, where market liberalisation rather than environmental norms 
is pursued, as discussed below. This illustrates that international actors involved in local 
governance often ‘pull’ in different directions (Schneckener, 2011: 230). This also applies to 
local actors, since governance is often underscored by ‘evolving interests’ and struggles for 
power (Menkhaus, 2007: 77).
The EU’s non-hierarchical shaping of environmental governance in Kosovo extends in 
other capacity-building and ‘learning’ (Börzel and Risse, 2010: 11) directions as well. The 
EU financed several environmental projects and collaborated with different state and non-
state actors in an attempt to build up the capacities of the environmental sector. This included 
the 2010–2012 EU-KEPA Twinning Project to Support the Environment Sector. Here, 
the EU contributed €1m to support Kosovo in developing administrative and institutional 
foundations required by the acquis. As a tool for pre-accession institution building, the project 
Environmental governance in a contested state 943
encouraged collaboration between the government of Kosovo and four external institutions: 
the Environment Agency Austria; the Federal Environment Agency of Germany; the Finnish 
Meteorological Institute; and the Latvian Environment, Geology, and Meteorology Centre. 
This type of collaboration also offers policy diffusion opportunities, often found in ‘nodal’ 
types of governance where ‘shifting networks’ and hybrid domestic–international bodies 
may facilitate funds and policies (Schneckener, 2011: 250).
In sum, the EU’s involvement in non-hierarchical policy making can be described as the 
‘carrot and stick’ approach of incentives and rewards/sanctions (Manners, 2002: 245). As 
Börzel and Risse (2010: 11) point out, incentives and benchmarking are important aspects 
of non-hierarchical steering, together with ‘communicative learning processes’, which are 
not as explicitly articulated in American involvement in statebuilding in Kosovo. The EU is 
involved in environmental governance in Kosovo through this exchange and norm diffusion, 
or broadly speaking, ‘Europeanisation’ (Börzel and Risse, 2000). For Europeanisation to take 
place, Börzel and Risse (2000: 2) argue, there must be some ‘misfit’ between European and 
domestic policies. Due to the legacies of conflict and Communism, the Western Balkans are 
thought to diverge from EU policies and structures in more comprehensive ways than CEECs 
(Juncos, 2011). Kosovo’s energy sector pollution levels are an instance of this divergence. 
The effect of the EU’s carrot and stick approach has largely been felt in the evolution of 
domestic environmental institutions, laws, and hierarchies, which still lack the necessary 
domestic capacity or willingness for their full implementation.
External actors: United States
The US is also concerned with building hierarchical governance in Kosovo by strengthening 
institutions: this often takes place through development aid aimed at building institutions 
such as ministries. However, the US also encourages market liberalisation, and the policies 
here are not always complementary to the EU’s – and its own – attempts at strengthening 
the hierarchy. The US has been heavily involved in Kosovo since the late 1990s and is still 
able to exert influence on domestic politics and determine key policy decisions, largely via a 
significant donor presence in the country and within the region.
However, American non-hierarchical steering in Kosovo does not closely resemble that 
of the EU, since bargaining, incentives, and conditionality are not as evident, or at least, not 
as explicitly stated (e.g. in USAID (2013)). Some of Kosovo’s key institutions – such as the 
Ministries of Finance and Energy and Mining (now defunct), the Central Bank of Kosovo, 
KEK, and ERO (USAID, 2010: 10) – were set up with significant input from USAID and 
other US donors. A large number of mainly US-funded consultants, including Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Advanced Engineering Associates International, Mott MacDonald, 
and others operate in the Kosovan energy and regulatory space. For instance, the consultancy 
Tetra Tech (funded by USAID) advises KEK on privatisation and operations, illustrating that 
in contrast to the EU, American assistance does not only go to NGOs, but also to businesses.
Although figures for total US disbursements to Kosovo declined in 2010 and 2011, 
according to the Balkan Civil Society Development Network (BCSDN), USAID is still the 
largest bilateral donor, and its donations are exceeded only by multilateral aid from the EU 
(€67m) and the World Bank (€50m) (BCSDN, 2012). Significantly, compared to the other 
two large bilateral donors, Germany and Norway, far more of US aid to Kosovo is earmarked 
for specific projects (including within the energy sector) – 73% in 2009 compared to 3.5% for 
Germany and 0% for Norway (OECD, 2012: 12), suggesting a greater degree of US control 
over aid in Kosovo.
American influence in Kosovo is not separate from the process of Europeanisation; rather, 
the two interact through both cooperation and competition. For instance, USAID highlights 
that the US government’s goals are: ‘building institutions’, encouraging ‘democratic process’, 
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promoting economic development, and the rule of law and European Integration (USAID, 2010: 
4). USAID specifically highlights that ‘all our assistance will contribute to support Kosovo’s 
integration into Europe’ (USAID, 2010: 6, added emphasis). These goals resonate with EU 
policy for the region and adopt the ‘Europeanisation’ narrative. In contrast, other major non-EU 
donors, such as the Norwegian government, focus less on European integration, and more on 
promotion of peace and human rights (The Norwegian Embassy Fund, 2011).
Despite US support for EU integration, however, its policy preferences for Kosovo in 
general, and the energy sector in particular, have not always coincided with those of the 
EU. For instance, within its broader goal of capacity building, USAID (2013: i) identifies 
three main development objectives for its 2014–2018 Kosovo strategy: (1) improved rule 
of law and governance, (2) increased investment and private sector employment, and (3) 
enhanced human capital. This contrasts EU involvement, whose priorities are much more 
diverse. The EU’s priorities for Kosovo range from the political (normalisation of relations 
with Serbia, minority rights, regional and international obligations) to economic and justice 
concerns (including corruption and money laundering) (European Commission, 2014). In 
the Commission progress reports, for instance, investment is integrated into economic and 
internal market categories, suggesting that whilst the EU deems investment an important 
factor for a functioning market economy, it is not singled out as a priority in its own right (e.g. 
European Commission, 2014: 24).
The different emphasis placed on investment and privatisation by EU and the USA 
has, at times, had a knock-on effect on the energy sector. Developments surrounding the 
privatisation of Kosovo B and rights to the new Kosovo C (‘Kosova e Re’) plant illustrate 
this. Initially, the Kosovan government planned the development of a 2100 MW Kosovo C 
plant, which would have greatly increased energy generating capacity. It also planned that 
the ownership and running of the new plant should be transferred together with ownership 
of Kosovo B and mining rights on a long-term basis (up to 40 years) to one single provider. 
Hence, privatisation would have occurred without competition. This contrast with the EU’s 
objective of opening up electricity markets and limiting natural monopolies whilst at the 
same time ensuring efficient regulation and ‘increased competition across and within borders’ 
(Pollitt, 2009: 15). The EU criticised the plan on the basis that a foreign firm would hold a 
virtual monopoly on Kosovo’s electricity market, leading to higher tariffs (Xharra, 2012). 
However, the plans were allegedly supported by the US Embassy.4 The government made 
attempts to remove the Energy Regulator Office’s involvement in the process of assigning 
tenders for the construction of this new generating capacity that were, however, rebuffed 
within the Parliamentary Assembly (International Civilian Office, 2009: 8). Nonetheless, the 
Kosovan government has made little progress in the privatisation and construction of Kosovo 
C. The plans were later reviewed by the World Bank (2011) with suggestions for a mix of 
thermal and renewable sources, a scaled-down 600 MW Kosovo C, the opening of a new 
lignite mine, closure of Kosovo A, and the refurbishment of Kosovo B. Even the new plans, 
however, involve only a limited degree of liberalisation and are the focus of civil society 
protest (Gashi, 2011).
This episode illustrates the influence of US involvement in Kosovo in general, and energy 
and environmental governance in particular. The originally proposed Kosovo C would have 
required 15% of Kosovan landmass for open cast mining, ash dumps, and power plants. This 
original plan matches with investors’ focus on lignite which is the ‘least expensive thermal 
option, even when the … higher environmental costs are priced in’ (World Bank, 2011: 
v). In addition to the environmental degradation, the pollution resultant from this project 
would have violated the Athens agreement and would not have been in line with EU’s vision 
4 Authors’ interview with civil society activist, 29 June 2011, Pristina.
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for liberalised electricity markets (c.f. Pollitt, 2009). This was used as the legal basis for 
opposition to the plan by civil society organisations, which persuaded the EU to support their 
position against the plan.5
A further source of tension between the EU and US, which has an impact on 
environmental governance in Kosovo, is that American donors appear to place less emphasis 
on the environment in their programming. For instance, whilst USAID prioritises energy 
supply projects in Kosovo, and is still committed to Kosovo C, it does not place as much 
emphasis on environmental issues, or encourage and require Kosovo to strengthen its energy 
laws and regulation. In fact, a number of actors, notably the World Bank and the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development – where the US is a major donor – have been 
criticised for investing heavily in Western Balkan energy projects that deviate from EU 
environmental standards (Gallop, 2013). This concerns the proposed Kosovo C plant, which 
would disincentivise Kosovo from reaching its 2020 renewables target (25%), committed to 
through the Energy Community (Gallop, 2013).
The case of Kosovo C illustrates the divergence between EU and US agendas. Whilst 
there is a shared commitment to stabilising Kosovo through EU integration, US donors focus 
more on market liberalisation through investment, with far less concern with environmental 
governance. The overall effect of this for environmental governance is that a lack of 
coherence – and the absence of consistent normative pressure from both actors – weakens 
the environmental governance ‘message’. It also undermines EU efforts to build hierarchical 
capacities in this sector.
External actors: Serbia
The EU’s attempts at strengthening hierarchical environmental governance are also undermined 
by Serbia’s non-consensual and informal involvement in the Kosovan energy space. Unlike 
the EU and the US, Serbia does not have an interest in enabling governance in Kosovo, but 
rather, sabotaging domestic governance efforts. The implication of this for environmental 
governance is the further weakening of (already weak) Kosovan hierarchical steerage.
Serbia’s involvement stems from its non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence, and its 
subsequent attempts to limit Kosovo’s statehood and capacity to enforce decisions (c.f. Risse, 
2011). Since 2000, Serbia has had no formal decision-making power in Kosovo. Nevertheless, 
Serbia has continually attempted to interfere in Kosovo’s domestic affairs and thus limit its 
statehood.
Serbia’s contestation of Kosovo’s independence has informal effects on Kosovo’s ability 
to enact domestic sovereignty on parts of its territory (c.f. Krasner and Risse, 2014: 549). 
For instance, Serbia finances informal ‘parallel institutions’ in Serb majority areas of North 
Kosovo, spending approximately €200m annually (International Crisis Group, 2011: 4).6 
Serbia’s influence means that Kosovan institutions (which govern over all their assigned 
competencies such as regulation) have little or no authority, legitimacy, and significance in 
the routine running of the North (see Krasniqi, 2012). Whilst this is most visible in elections 
(whereby Northern Kosovo Serbs tend to vote in Serbian, rather than Kosovan elections) 
and public service provision, it also has important consequences for the energy sector and 
environmental governance.
One instance where informal practices undermine formal rules is in the case of electricity 
bill non-payment, which is particularly acute in the North according to ERO officials.7 
5 Authors’ interview with civil society activist, 29 June 2011, Pristina. 
6 This figure is likely to have decreased since 2011; however, it is difficult to find a precise, up-to-date 
number as this funding is often unclear and contested.
7 Authors’ interview, ERO official, 1 July 2011.
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The 2011 figures suggest total technical losses of 16.78% and commercial losses of 21.37% 
of the total electricity consumption (ERO, 2012: 34). Three areas of electricity supply have 
been created by KEK – A, B, and C – corresponding to the degree of non-payment. In ‘A’ areas, 
electricity is less frequently cut off than in B and C areas. Mitrovica (partly in Serb-majority 
North Kosovo) is reported to have commercial losses of 48% in 2009, largely due to KEK’s 
‘inability to carry out billing and collection activities’ in North Mitrovica (ERO, 2012). Non-
payment in Serb majority areas, whilst partly due to the region’s high unemployment rate and 
a relatively poor population, is also encouraged by the official Serbian policy of contesting 
and denying the authority of all Kosovan institutions and (public) services. Furthermore, 
there is also a ‘Serbian power utility maintaining an unlicensed branch’ in the North which 
hinders Kosovo’s management of its power system (European Commission, 2012: 45).
In addition, the Kosovan energy sector is shaped by its connections with the former 
Yugoslav grid, some of which is effectively controlled by Serbian actors. For instance, 
the North includes power facilities such as those on Mount Kopaonik and the ‘Ujmani’ 
hydropower plant. Furthermore, water from Gazivoda Lake (bordering Serbia) is used to cool 
the Kosovo B power plant. Kosovo thus has to rely on good relations with Serbia to ensure 
the smooth running of these operations. Kosovan policy makers have tried to overcome the 
constraints this imposes on independent decision making on energy by creating an energy 
supply connection with neighbouring Albania (Sahiti, 2012: 11).
Furthermore, in 2010, the Energy Community Secretariat ruled that Serbia is in breach of 
agreed regulations, since it had not paid the relevant electricity transit fees to KOSTT, despite 
a set of mutual agreements governing the relationship between KOSTT and the Serbian 
transmission network operator, EMS (BIRN, 2014).
In 2014, EMS and KOSTT signed a framework agreement regarding commercial and 
operational relations between the two companies, which should also help resolve energy 
issues in the North (BIRN, 2014). However, the agreement is not yet fully operational (BIRN, 
2014), and the energy sector thus remains one of the last remaining spheres through which 
Serbia can infiltrate Kosovo and create challenges to governance.
Serbia’s non-consensual involvement in the energy space in Kosovo is informal and 
is often denied by Kosovo’s energy officials.8 It does not form an attempt at governance 
as such: Serbia has no authority to unilaterally impose decisions on Kosovo, nor does 
it offer positive incentives, bargaining, and learning opportunities. However, in some 
cases, for instance, running parallel institutions in the North, Serbia behaves as though it 
has authority to govern hierarchically. This has predominantly resulted from an attempt 
to project its power and control into its former province and less from any real interest 
in local affairs. This illustrates clearly the notion that governance is not simply about 
the establishment of hierarchies, rules, and steering but often involves localised power 
struggles (c.f. Menkhaus, 2007).
Although Serbia has no real authority in Kosovo and its decision making, its non-
consensual involvement in energy matters decreases Kosovo’s capacity to implement all 
rules and decisions pertaining to this sector. Serbia is, in effect, a governance ‘spoiler’ 
(see Menkhaus, 2007). This also politicises the energy sector, drawing both parties into 
protracted debates over resource control and revenue and detracting Kosovan authorities’ 
attention further away from mainstreaming energy into environmental policies. The effect 
of Serbia’s informal practices is a reduced ability of Kosovo to autonomously operate and 
regulate its energy market and supply, further destabilising an already unconsolidated model 
of environmental governance.
8 Authors’ interview with KEK official, 29 June 2011, Pristina.
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Conclusion
When the variety of different institutions and actors and their formal and informal inputs 
into policy making are considered, energy policy as an aspect of environmental governance 
in Kosovo appears exceedingly complex. The emerging model of environmental governance 
seems to be characterised by a weak hierarchy, mainly as a result of external actor involvement, 
with policy change being driven primarily by donor preferences and EU conditionality, rather 
than domestic debate and demands. Above all, the weakness of hierarchy reflects a lack of 
domestic state capacity – further weakened by the informal and non-consensual involvement 
of Serbia – and the weakness of non-state actors.
Whilst it might be assumed that the presence and influence of international actors would 
provide an opportunity for non-state actors to exert influence and to lobby at multiple 
levels, the case of Kosovo C demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. Rather than 
empowering domestic non-state actors, the presence of multiple external actors actually 
enables the Kosovan government to respond directly to the particular external agenda it 
favours and to resist the demands of civil society or indeed other external interests. Yet, 
as our case study demonstrates, despite a broad consensus shared by donors regarding 
the need for liberalisation and greater environmental regulation, the critical divergence 
between the EU and the US has stymied the Commission’s attempts to achieve more 
progressive environmental reforms.
What the case study seems to confirm is that the extensive involvement of external actors 
is no substitute for the weakness of state institutions and the lack of hierarchy. Domestic non-
state actors seem to suffer most: they appear to be excluded from the critical (and somewhat 
covert) interaction between external actors and the Kosovan government. Thus, what may 
at first glance appear to be a model of progressive multi-level steering is in fact a mirage: 
extensive external involvement and the lack of domestic sovereignty and capacity leaves 
environmental governance in Kosovo vulnerable to informal practices which undermine 
statebuilding efforts and external actors’ attempts at strengthening hierarchy. Informal 
practices such as interference from Serbia, and clientelism inherent in domestic politics, 
create a context in which environmental interests are subordinated to local power struggles 
or are irrelevant for political campaigns and re-election, and thus further weaken hierarchical 
steerage of environmental governance.
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